![]() for a primary command role in the Battle of the North Atlantic. The RCN decided to use the high level Atlantic Convoy Conference to push the R.N. The time was now ripe for the RCN to win important concessions from its patronizing allies.Īn example of the Canadian corvettes that protected Atlantic convoys during world war II ![]() because it forced the Americans to pour all its naval resources into the Pacific, leaving little for the Atlantic. Japan's entry into the war provided the RCN with unexpected bargaining leverage to pry the command of Atlantic convoy escort operations away from the U.S. naval authority was no different added Brodeur. "The British Admiralty," concluded Canada's Admiral Brodeur, "still looked upon the RCN as the naval child to be seen and not heard when no outsider looked on or listened in". The dismissive attitude taken by British and American naval authorities to Canada's views on the disposition of its own naval resources frustrated and angered senior RCN officers. And yet, despite this large contribution, Canada had no say in the strategic use of its considerable anti-submarine resources. By the end of 1942, Canada provided 48 percent of all the convoy escorts. ![]() Oil tanker his by a German submarine during World War IIĬanada devoted all its naval resources to the role of protecting the transatlantic convoys. For Hitler, the submarine campaign had assumed, next to the Eastern front, the most important role in Germany's war strategy. "If the menace could not be conquered", explains historian Gerhard Weinberg, "the steady diminution of Allied tonnage would immobilize the Western Allies." By 1943, the battle to control the shipping lanes had become World War II's pivotal "battlefield". With the rate of shipping losses exceeding the rate of production, the Allied leaders gave the submarine problem top priority at their January 1943 meeting in Casablanca. In November 1942 alone, 720,000 tons of supplies were sunk by German submarines. By the end of 1942, the German submarine "wolf-packs" were exacting a devastating toll on Allied shipping. Despite this advantage, protecting slow moving convoys that extended over many square miles proved extremely difficult. Large convoys lost proportionately fewer ships. The Allies concluded very early on that there was safety in numbers. To assign a naval vessel to escort each supply ship was also utterly impractical.Įxample of a Atlantic convoy during world War II Their slow speeds made them perfect prey for German submarines. Unless they were one of the very fast luxury passenger liners, like the Queen Mary, sending solitary supply ships cross the Atlantic was sheer folly. The failure of Germany's surface fleet to sever Great Britain's life-line to North America, led to the promotion of the submarine as Germany's principal form of naval warfare. In World War II, Germany reasoned that if it could choke-off all the transatlantic re-supply lines to Great Britain, from Canada and the United States, then Great Britain's demise would only be a matter of time. ![]() World War II Antisubmarine Warfare Sets the Stage Navy Builds NTDS and Royal Canadian Navy’s DATAR Collapses
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